FlexRay is a time triggered automotive communication protocol that connects ECUs (Electronic Control Units) on which distributed automotive applications are executed. If exact agreement (e.g. on physical values measured by redundant sensors on different ECUs) must be reached in the presence of asymmetric communication faults, a byzantine agreement protocol like Signed Messages (SM) can be utilized. This paper gives examples of how byzantine faults can emerge in a FlexRay-based system and proposes optimizations for a FlexRay-specific implementation of the SM protocol. The protocol modifications allow for a reduction in the number of protocol messages under a slightly relaxed fault model, as well as for a reduction in the number of messages to be temporarily stored by the ECUs. For some safety relevant automotive applications like driveby-wire applications the utilization of a byzantine agreement protocol is an option. Fig. 1 gives an abstract example of an application that runs on four ECUs (nodes) connected via two redundant FlexRay channels. Three of these nodes are connected to redundant sensors that operate within a certain tolerance. For our example we will assume that the actual physical value is 5.0 and we will consider all sensor values between 4.5 and 5.5 to be correct in the sense of "acceptably precise".
INTRODUCTION
Distributed automotive applications run on several ECUs (Electronic Control Units) that are connected to the vehicle's sensors and actuators and communicate with each other via automotive bus systems like CAN [1] or FlexRay [2] .
For some safety relevant automotive applications like driveby-wire applications the utilization of a byzantine agreement protocol is an option. Fig. 1 gives an abstract example of an application that runs on four ECUs (nodes) connected via two redundant FlexRay channels. Three of these nodes are connected to redundant sensors that operate within a certain tolerance. For our example we will assume that the actual physical value is 5.0 and we will consider all sensor values between 4.5 and 5.5 to be correct in the sense of "acceptably precise".
Depending on the application it may not be sufficient to guarantee that each fault free node will choose an individual value between 4.5 and 5.5 (approximate agreement) but it may be necessary that all fault free nodes agree on the exactly the same value v (4.5 ≤ v ≤ 5.5) (exact agreement).
Exact agreement on a single value is desirable whenever the nodes must take a consistent threshold decision that is based on the sensed value. Exact agreement can also be desirable if the nodes accumulate state information that diverges from the state information stored in the other nodes over time (e.g. by integrating acceleration to calculate a velocity value) [3] . A realistic example for a threshold decision is a mode change from a normal operation mode to a degraded mode that must be performed by either all nodes or by none of the nodes. For our example we will assume that the nodes will perform a mode change to a degraded mode if the value chosen is greater than 4.9.
Figure 1. Approximate agreement
If each node N1, N2 and N3 just sends out a single broadcast message to distribute its local sensor value, a single byzantine fault in N1 may result in the scenario depicted in Fig. 1 . The message sent by N1 was asymmetrically received by N2, N3 and N4 such that N2 did not receive any value from N1 whereas N3 and N4 received the correct value (benign byzantine fault). If each node executes, for example, the lower median function on the vector of available values the nodes N1, N3 and N4 will perform a mode switch, whereas N2 will not perform a mode switch.
In our example exact agreement on a single sensor value among the fault free nodes even in presence of a single byzantine fault can be achieved, if each of the nodes N1, N2 and N3 distributes its local sensor value by taking the role of a commander in one of three parallel executions of the classic SM protocol (signed messages) [4] . The three parallel executions will result in the exact same 3-element consistency vector available to all fault free nodes. Since this vector may contain at most one faulty sensor value, this faulty value can be masked out by choosing the lower median of all three values. Even if the median selects the value from the faulty node this value is obviously acceptable since it is neither smaller than the smallest fault free value nor greater than the greatest fault free value in the vector.
In general SM runs in F max + 1 rounds to tolerate any number of F max ≤ m traitors, with m being the total number of generals. Agreement protocols like OM (oral messages) that do not make use of signatures need at least 3F max + 1 generals to tolerate F max traitors. These protocols are not considered practical for automotive applications since important cases that involve three ECUs (agreement between two loyal nodes in presence of a single traitor) cannot be addressed.
Since the implementation of a membership service can be based on an available agreement service, the need for membership service also motivates the implementation of an agreement protocol. Examples for automotive use cases for a membership service are given in [5] and [6] . This paper uses the terminology introduced by Lamport, Shostak and Pease [4] where a faulty node is a traitor, a node that is fault free is said to be loyal, a node that initiates an agreement protocol in order to distribute a local value is called a commander (or commanding general), the nodes that must agree on the commanders value are called lieutenants (or lieutenant general), and both commanders and lieutenants are considered to be generals.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows:
In the next section we will give some basic information on the FlexRay system and analyze how the following assumptions made in [4] can be met by a FlexRay system: A1. A message that is sent is delivered correctly.
A2.
The receiver of a message knows who sent it.
A3. The absence of a message can be detected.
After that we give some FlexRay specific examples of benign and malicious byzantine faults. This is necessary since it is not obvious how byzantine faults can actually emerge in a broadcast communication system. Lamport's paper does not deal with such questions since it is based on the assumption of point-to-point communication, where a faulty sender may send out different values to different receivers.
Then after giving some fundamental information on the SM protocol and introducing the concept of an acceptable message we analyze the number of messages that must be stored during the execution of the SM protocol. Since memory in the ECUs is a cost factor we propose a modification of the protocol that reduces the number of stored messages.
The total bandwidth required in a communication system is always important. For that reason we also present a protocol modification that reduces the number of messages by slightly relaxing the original assumptions on the fault model.
Finally we present examples of the potential for improvements using the protocol modification, discuss the possibility of combining the modifications, and provide a brief summary
The nodes participating in a FlexRay system share a common notion of time. This notion of time, referred to as the global time, arises as a result of a fault-tolerant clock synchronization algorithm that ensures that, to within a bounded precision, all of the nodes in the system consider an event (such as the start of a slot, or the start of a cycle) to occur at the same point in time. This common notion of time is what facilitates the use of a TDMA scheme to control media access.
FlexRay provides two different media access methods that can be used to send messages in the system, and the FlexRay cycle provides separate portions, called segments, devoted to each of these media access types. In the static segment, the media access mechanism could be considered "pure TDMA" -the segment is divided into a number of equally sized slots, and each of these slots is assigned for transmission to exactly one node. When the global time reaches the time of the slot if the node that owns the slot has a transmission ready it sends it in the slot. If it has no transmission it sends a special "null frame" that contains no information. In normal operation each slot contains only one message, and all messages sent in the static segment have the same length (in terms of the number of bytes that make up the message).
In order to ensure that all nodes see a message in the same slot, the duration of a static slot must be larger than the time required to actually transmit the messages sent in the slot. A receiver will only accept a message if it both begins and ends within the slot. In theory it is possible to size the static slots such that more than one message could fit in the slot such that, under fault conditions, a faulty node could send more than one message in a slot. This possibility can be prevented at design time by limiting the duration of the static slots to less than twice the minimum transmission time of the individual messages sent in static segment. This paper assumes the FlexRay cycle is designed to prevent more than one message in a slot.
The assignment of slots to nodes is done at system design time, and it does not change during the operation of the protocol. As a result, at any given point in the static segment all nodes in the system know who is allowed to transmit. This allows, for example, additional protection to be implemented in the form of a bus guardian that ensures that only the node allowed to transmit in a given slot is actually able to transmit in the slot. Further, the fixed relationship of slots to nodes ensures that nodes always have access to the bandwidth they are allocated at design time, and they always are granted this access at the same predefined point in time in each cycle. These characteristics allow the design of highly predictable systems. This preallocation of bandwidth, combined with the possibility of the use of bus guardians to ensure that other nodes cannot interfere with a node's transmissions, partially ensure property A1. Finally, since all nodes in the system know in advance when a node is supposed to transmit information, receiving nodes can easily detect the absence of a message simply by checking at the end of the slot whether or not the information has been received (property A3).
The second media access method available in FlexRay supports dynamic allocation of bandwidth depending on whether or not a node has a message to transmit. This is done using a minislotting method similar to the method used in the byteflight communication protocol [7] . This media access method, which is used in the dynamic segment of the FlexRay cycle, does not use a fixed TDMA procedure but rather changes the sizes of the slots depending on whether a node transmits a message. If a node transmits the slot expands until transmission is complete. If a node does not transmit the slot "collapses" into a small period of time. As a result, the timing of the messages sent in the dynamic segment varies based on whether or not other messages are actually transmitted (i.e., transmission times are not known a priori), and this limits the ability to protect media access using bus guardians. Further, since the duration of the dynamic segment is fixed, it is not guaranteed that a node that wants to access the bus will actually be able to (if, for example, nodes that come before it in the dynamic segment have already used up all available time). As a result, it is expected that the applications that would likely use an agreement protocol would not be likely to use the dynamic segment. The remainder of this paper assumes that all communication is done in the static segment.
FlexRay was targeted for fault tolerant applications. Since such applications generally require redundancy, the protocol has built in support for physical layer redundancy. This is done by providing two distinct physical channels, labeled "channel A" and "channel B". Each channel uses an identical but independent media access mechanism, and in the static segment the slot sizes and slot boundaries are the same for both channels. Slots can be assigned to nodes independently on channels A and B, i.e., a given slot number can be assigned to one node on channel A and a different node on channel B. Obviously it is also possible to assign a slot to a node on both channels, and this is often done on systems using channel level redundancy.
This paper assumes that all nodes involved in the agreement mechanism are connected to both channels. Furthermore, it is assumed that the channel level redundancy that is part of the FlexRay protocol is used to transmit critical data (i.e., data is transmitted by sending identical copies of the data on channel A and channel B), and that this redundancy is sufficient such that a node that wants to send information is able, with a high degree of confidence, to be certain that at least one of the copies of the message is received by other nodes in the system, thus ensuring the remainder of property A1. If channel redundancy is not considered sufficient it is possible to augment this with temporal redundancy (i.e., send a message more than one time in a cycle). 1 The format of FlexRay messages is fairly complicated (refer to [2] for details). Of particular note are the two CRC's that are part of the message, the header CRC and the frame CRC. Both of these will be discussed again in the next section, but for the time being we will focus on the header CRC. In order for a message to be considered valid by a receiver it must have a valid header CRC, which is a function of the slot identifier. The transmitter does not compute the header CRCit is configured into the transmitter at design time. As a result, only the intended transmitter will be able to generate a message that would be considered valid by the receivers of a system. Combined with the fact that all receivers have a priori knowledge of the relationship between the slot and the sender (and the content of the data in the slot) it is easy to see that property A2 is met by FlexRay. The strength of this property can also be enhanced by the use of bus guardians (which further ensure that only the legitimate owner of the slot is able to transmit in the slot).
FlexRay supports a variety of network topologies. The most simple topology is a passive bus where each node is directly connected to both channel A and channel B or to only one of the two channels. In practice the active star topology is of particular relevance. In this topology every node has an individual link to a central active star device. A FlexRay star is functionally similar to an Ethernet hub. Whenever a node sends a message, the star will forwarded the message to all other nodes connected to it. Star topologies are sometimes used in safety related applications since the stars have certain error detection capabilities that help to isolate faults that may occur on a single branch only (e.g. a short of a bus line to ground). Furthermore stars make it possible to run FlexRay networks over longer distances. Examples of single channel and dual channel star topologies will be shown in the next section.
Similar to several other communication protocols like CAN, the physical layers used by the channels of the FlexRay protocol have broadcast behavior. As a result, activity that is presented by a node onto a channel of the network is normally received by all the other nodes connected to that channel. Specifically, with FlexRay it is not required to send individual point-to-point transmissions to all receivers of a message -a single transmission on the physical layer would suffice as it would be received by all other nodes. This is somewhat different than the assumption made in [4] , which assumes independent point-to-point connections between the nodes in the system. In the protocols described by Lamport et al, the messages sent by loyal generals to each of the receivers are intended to be identical -as a result, there is no handicap imposed by broadcast transmission -to the contrary, the fact that in general all messages are broadcast actually makes it more difficult for certain types of byzantine faults to exist in a FlexRay network. This topic will be discussed in more detail in the next section.
BYZANTINE FAULTS IN FLEXRAY
We begin by describing various faults that can occur in a FlexRay system. Obviously a faulty node can send incorrect information to the other nodes in the system. Assume that a faulty node can show byzantine behavior which means that a faulty process may not only send out faulty messages ("wrong values") but it may also send out different messages to different receiving nodes. This of course also includes that it may "forget" to send some or all of its messages to some or all receiving nodes. If a faulty node sends different values to different receiving nodes we define this as a malicious byzantine fault (MBF). If the node sends a single value to some of the receiving nodes and does not send a value to some other receiving nodes we talk about a benign byzantine fault (BBF). Referring to terminology used in [4] we can associate a faulty node (general) that shows byzantine behavior with the term "traitor" and terms like "traitorous general", "traitorous commander" or "traitorous lieutenant" and a fault free node (general) with terms like "loyal general", "loyal commander" or "loyal lieutenant".
As discussed in the previous section, the physical layers used by FlexRay have broadcast properties (i.e., under normal circumstances it is assumed that a message sent on the network is received by all other nodes connected to the network). Initially this may seem at odds with the characteristics of a byzantine fault (where different receivers have different notions of what was transmitted on the network). In this section it is shown that such faults can indeed happen in FlexRay systems, providing examples of mechanisms that can introduce various types of byzantine faults in a system. First, consider the behavior of the FlexRay channel. Obviously a fault in a channel can prevent information from being transferred through the network. If the faulty network results in only some nodes receiving the information, while other nodes do not receive any information this would result in a benign byzantine fault. An example of a fault that could have this behavior is for the transmitter to send signals on the FlexRay network that are slightly off specification (SOS) such that the drive voltages are slightly below the required minimum voltage levels. As the various receivers will each have different sensitivity levels it is possible that some nodes will be able to receive the signal while other nodes will not. This would result in a BBF for the transmission of the node in question.
Is it possible for a channel, on its own, to introduce a malicious byzantine fault? In order for this to occur the channel would have to either create a message on its own (i.e., create a message that was never sent by the transmitter and is only accepted by some receivers), or it would have to selectively modify a message that was sent by a transmitter such that some receivers get a modified version of the original message and other receivers get an unmodified version (or a differently modified version) of the original message. The complexity of the FlexRay frame format (containing a number of fields with predefined values, very specific timing requirements, and frame and header CRC's which must match the contents of the frame) make it essentially impossible that real channels would be able to generate a message that would be accepted by the receivers. Furthermore, the FlexRay frame CRC provides strong checks intended to detect modification of the data while in transit on the FlexRay channel. If the characteristics of the FlexRay frame CRC alone are not deemed sufficient it is always possible to add additional end-to-end signatures to the data to provide even more powerful detection of potential modifications. Practical systems are likely to introduce such checks for other reasons anyway. As a result, it is highly unlikely that a real world channel would be able to undetectably modify the data and therefore we assume that although it is possible for the FlexRay channel to introduce benign byzantine faults into the system, it is not possible for the channel to introduce malicious byzantine faults.
Can byzantine faults be introduced by faulty nodes in the system (i.e., can a faulty node induce byzantine results with a properly operating channel)? One way that a BFF could be introduced by a transmitting node is by another type of slightly off specification fault. Consider a node that sends a Transmission Start Sequence (TSS) that is slightly shorter than is configured for the system (refer to [2] for details on the TSS). Different branches of an active star will exhibit different amounts of truncation of the TSS (as long as all branches are within the allowed tolerance of truncation this does not represent a fault of the channel). Starting with an already shortened TSS, it is possible that some branches (those with greater truncation) will see a signal with a TSS that is too short to be accepted by the protocol, while other branches (those with smaller truncation) will see a signal that is able to be accepted by the protocol. This would result in a benign byzantine fault that is caused entirely by the transmitting node (Fig 2) .
Figure 2. Benign byzantine fault caused by off specification TSS
A similar mechanism can also introduce malicious byzantine faults. Consider a dual channel system that has a fault in the transmitter that results in the TSS being slightly shorter than specified on both channels (caused by, for example, a bit clock that is slightly too fast). The paths that transmissions follow are not identical on the different channels -for example it is possible that the path along Channel A experiences relatively small truncation while the path along Channel B has a relatively large truncation, even though both are well within specification. Due to the BBF scenario described above a receiver may experience a benign byzantine fault (i.e., not receive a message when other nodes do receive the message). This can happen independently on each channel. Consider a node that (maliciously, or perhaps as a result of a fault) sends two different messages, X and X′, on the two channels. When this is combined with the benign byzantine faults that can result from a slightly off specification TSS it is easy to see that various combinations could result -some nodes might receive both X and X′, some might receive only X, some might receive only X′, and some might receive nothing at all. As a result, the faulty behavior of the transmitting node, combined with a different, but still within specification, behavior of the channel could result in a malicious byzantine fault in the system (Fig. 3) .
Figure 3. Malicious byzantine fault caused by off specification TSS
In the next section we will have a look at some of the properties of the SM protocol.
SM PROTOCOL
The SM protocol begins with the commander sending his value in a signed message to every lieutenant in round 1. 2 Each lieutenant L that receives a message msg in round r that was signed by r different generals other than L and contains a value v that L has not received before will store this value in the set V of received values (V := V ∪ v), will cosign msg and send out the cosigned message in round r+1 to all lieutenants other than those who have already signed msg. Once all protocol messages have been exchanged L will either select the agreed value on the basis of the values available in V or select a default value if V is empty. Note that the given description of the protocol implies that no loyal lieutenant will send a message after round 2 if the commander is loyal.
Details on the algorithm and the proof of correctness are given in [4] , but it's worth pointing out the fundamental idea behind SM:
If a new value v is received by a loyal lieutenant L in round r with 1 ≤ r ≤ F max , the loyal lieutenant will make sure that v is distributed to all loyal lieutenants. A scenario that must be prevented is that a message with a new value v sent by a traitor in round F max +1 is received and accepted by a single loyal lieutenant L (or only some of the loyal lieutenants) in round F max +1 for the first time. Since F max +1 is the last round of the protocol there would be no opportunity to forward the message to those who have not received it. This can never happen, however, since a loyal lieutenant will only accept a message in round F max +1 if it carries F max +1 valid signatures.
Since there are at most F max traitors it is guaranteed that a message that is accepted in round F max +1 was accepted by at least one loyal lieutenant in an earlier round, and thus would be distributed to all other loyal lieutenants.
In general we call a message msg received by a loyal lieutenant L in round r an accepted (or acceptable) message if: a). msg is not corrupted (e.g. no CRC errors, no corruption of the frame format).
b). msg was signed by r different generals.
c). L has not accepted a message signed and cosigned by the exact same generals in the exact same order before.
Since a traitor is free to accept or reject any specific message anyway, we use this term for loyal lieutenants only.
The original algorithm presented in [4] accepts messages even if they do not meet condition c. This results in an unlimited maximum number of messages, since a traitor can send multiple copies of a message that meets conditions a and b, all of which will be accepted and forwarded by a loyal lieutenant. We introduce condition c to limit the number of messages. This condition does not compromise the proof of correctness given in the original paper in any way. At a first glance condition c seems to imply the need for a loyal lieutenant to check whether he has already received a copy of a given message. But since we can eliminate a traitor's ability to send out multiple copies of the same message by a proper configuration of the FlexRay system (cp. section on properties of the FlexRay system) it is not necessary to perform this check.
MESSAGES TO BE STORED
As explained in the introduction we intend to reduce the number of values vs that must be temporarily stored by a loyal lieutenant during protocol execution. We start out by analyzing the number of values that must be temporarily stored when using the standard SM protocol. Table 1 gives an example (m=5, Commander: C0, Lieutenants: L1, L2, L3, L4, Traitors: C0, L1, L2). The example is arranged such that the traitorous generals invent a new value whenever possible in order to increase the number of different values to be stored by the loyal lieutenants. Since it is our intention to generate the highest possible number of different commands to be stored by the loyal lieutenants it is mandatory to choose the commander to be a traitor. If the commander was loyal, each loyal lieutenant would store only exactly one command.
An entry like "L1: V 1 :0:1 → L1, L2: V 2 | L3, L4: V 3 " in Table 1 can be read as follows:
• Read "L1: V 1 :0:1 →" as: "L1 forwards a message that contains the value V 1 which was signed by C0 and cosigned by L1 via broadcast…".
• Read "L1,L2: V 2 | L3, L4: V 3 " as: "… but due to byzantine behavior the value V 2 is actually received and accepted by L1 and L2 whereas the value V 3 is received and accepted by L3 and L4".
The example given in Table 1 does not show the messages sent and received in the last round (r = F max +1 = 4) since this would significantly increase the size of the table and, as already explained, it is impossible that a message that is accepted in round F max +1 is a message that was not presented to a loyal lieutenant in an earlier round.
In the example a total number of 14 values are introduced. We are, however, only interested in the maximum number of values a loyal lieutenant (L3 and L4) must be able to store.
The 10 values that must be stored by L3 and L4 are {V 3 , V 4 , V 6 , V 7 , V 9 , V 10 , V 11 , V 12 , V 13 , V 14 }. The other values (V 1 , V 2 , V 5 , V 8 ) are never sent out to a loyal lieutenant.
Since a traitor cannot forge a loyal general's signature, a traitor can only replace a value by a different and "new" value if the message has not been signed by a loyal general. In Table 1 Table 1 . Note that in the example we implicitly assume collusion among traitors, i.e., a traitor is able to forge another traitor's signature. This is consistent with the assumptions in [4] .
We have seen that in the given example there were 5 messages that were "opportunities" for inventing new values that would be accepted by loyal generals. In general the number of "opportunities" O r in round r can be calculated as follows:
Formula 1: Calculation of o r
Each "opportunity" can be used to introduce m − F max new values that will be accepted by a loyal lieutenant. Therefore the maximum number of values vs to be stored by a loyal lieutenant is limited by: 
REDUCING THE NUMBER OF MESSAGES TO BE STORED
A minor modification of the original SM algorithm reduces the number of messages to be stored. We will later refer to this modification as SM-FAM (SM-Forward All Messages).
As already mentioned, the standard SM protocol requires a lieutenant L who receives an acceptable message msg with a value v to check if v is a new value (v∉ V) that has not already been received in a previous message. Only if this is the case will L cosign msg, send out the cosigned message in round r+1 to all lieutenants that have not already signed msg, and store the new value in V (V:= V∪ v).
The key idea behind SM-FAM is to modify the behavior of the lieutenants such that a lieutenant L that receives an acceptable message msg in round r will always (whether or not v is a new value) cosign and forward msg in round r+1 as described above. Furthermore L will not maintain a set of received values, but L will instead store only a single value in V. If msg is the first acceptable message received by L, L stores v. Otherwise L will check if v differs from the already stored value. If this is the case L will store a predefined default value on which the loyal lieutenants will eventually agree. Note that if a loyal lieutenant receives two or more acceptable messages that carry different values it is obvious that the commander is a traitor. According to the description of the byzantine agreement problem given in [4] the loyal lieutenants may in this case agree on an arbitrary default value.
The following algorithm gives pseudo code that describes the behavior of a lieutenant L who processes a message msg received in round r.
Figure 4. Behavior of lieutenant L
The pseudcode above uses some non-standard notation. The extractValue function in line 2 extracts the value v which is part of the message msg. Line 3 checks whether a value has not already been stored by the lieutenant (i.e., whether V is the empty set). The message is cosigned by L in line 12, and then scheduled for broadcast transmission in the next round by line 13.
A consequence of the idea to always cosign and forward an acceptable message is that SM-FAM will always -even in absence of traitors -send as many messages as SM sends in the worst case. This would be a clear disadvantage if we would intend to implement the agreement protocol based on an event based communication system like Ethernet or CAN. However, using the time triggered communication offered by FlexRay's static segment the situation is different. In this case static slots must be statically allocated to the ECUs and we need to reserve a static slot for each agreement protocol message we may have to send. 3 Using SM-FAM these slots will always contain a message, whereas with standard SM some of these slots may elapse without being used (for example in case the actual number of traitors is lower than the number of traitors the protocol is configured to tolerate).
Of course one could think of implementing a transport layer that utilizes the unused slots but such a layer would provide bandwidth for best effort traffic only and it would significantly increase the complexity of the software running on the ECU. Since this layer would have to interact with the safety relevant agreement protocol there would also be the potential need to certify the layer according to automotive standards like ISO 26262 [8] and to integrate the layer with standard automotive middleware like AUTOSAR [9] . For all these reasons the implementation of such a layer may be unattractive in an automotive environment.
NUMBER OF MESSAGES
As a next step we will now present another modification of the algorithm that reduces the number of protocol messages exchanged. Before presenting this modification we will have a look at the respective known numbers for the standard SM protocol:
Under the assumption of unicast messages the maximum number of acceptable messages sent in round r is (m−1)! / (m −r−1)!. This results in the maximum total number of acceptable messages given in Formula 3.
Formula 3: Maximum number of acceptable unicast messages
Since FlexRay sends broadcast messages the number of acceptable messages in round r is reduced to (m−1)! / (m−r)! so that the total number of messages n is limited by Formula 4.
Formula 4: Maximum number of acceptable broadcast messages

REDUCING THE NUMBER OF MESSAGES
The modification of the SM algorithm we are going to present reduces the maximum number of acceptable messages to be exchanged in the course of a protocol execution. We will later refer to this modification as SM-NC (SM -No Collusion).
SM-NC slightly relaxes the fault model to disallow collusion among traitors. Doing so we exclude the following kinds of behavior:
• a fault allows a traitor x to forge the signature of another traitor y. We design the system such that, in absence of faults, node x does not even store the secret key required to generate node y's signature. A fault would therefore have to result in traitor y sending its secret key to traitor x and traitor x using this key to sign messages. Note that we assume the signature algorithm to be strong enough to prevent the signature from being "guessed" by a faulty node.
• a fault causes a traitor x to send a message to a traitor y which is then, due to a fault in y, signed by y and sent back to x even though the code of the agreement protocol does not normally allow these message exchanges.
If we consider it sufficiently unlikely that a traitor will show such behavior it is justified to exclude collusion from our fault model. As stated in the section "Byzantine Faults in FlexRay" we assume that it is not possible for the channel to introduce malicious byzantine faults and it is therefore not possible that the number of different values is further increased by the channel.
In later rounds (r > 1) neither a traitorous commander nor a traitorous lieutenant can invent an acceptable message with r signatures that carries a value different from vA and vB since we have disallowed collusion among traitors.
With these assumptions in place we can recalculate the number of acceptable broadcast messages we need to reserve bandwidth for. In round 1 only a single message is sent by the commander. In round 2 each of the (m−1) lieutenants will send a single message. For each round r with r > 2 the number of acceptable messages is 2 (m−1). Since the protocol runs in F max + 1 rounds, Formula 5 gives the total number of messages we have to reserve FlexRay slots for:
Formula 5: Number of broadcast messages for which slots must be reserved (SM-NC)
Although n is the number of broadcast messages we need to reserve slots for, the number of acceptable messages that will actually be sent in the course of a single execution of the protocol is much lower:
In the first round the commander will get the chance to send out only a single acceptable message and by doing this he may introduce at most two different values. During the remaining F max rounds a lieutenant will send out at most two acceptable broadcast messages. This is due to the fact that a lieutenant will only send a message if he receives an acceptable message with a value he did not receive before. Since there are only two different values this can happen only twice.
So the total number of messages n SE that are actually sent in the course of a single execution of the protocol is limited by n SE ≤ 2m−1. For F max = 1 this result is correct but too pessimistic since in this case only a single acceptable message is sent in round 1 and at most m−1 messages are sent in round 2. Formula 6 summarizes these considerations.
Formula 6: Maximum number of acceptable messages sent in the course of a single execution of the protocol (SM-NC)
It is important to note the following:
• For the original SM protocol we did not differentiate between n and n SE since it is possible (although unlikely) that the number of messages given by Formula 4 are actually sent in the course of a single execution of the algorithm.
• As discussed before, under the assumption of using FlexRay's static segment for sending the protocol messages we cannot avoid reserving bandwidth for all n messages even though only n SE messages will actually be sent.
• Also note that the only difference between a FlexRay based implementation of SM-NC and SM is in the number of slots reserved for sending out messages in a given round r. Table 2 gives examples of the number of messages for which bandwidth must be reserved as well as the number of messages to be stored.
EXAMPLE NUMBERS
COMBINING SM-NC WITH SM-FAM
The two proposed protocol variants SM-NC and SM-FAM can easily be combined with each other to form a new variant (SM-NC-FAM). Since SM-FAM requires every value (whether new or not) to be forwarded, the number of acceptable messages sent in the course of a single execution of the protocol is no longer equal the number given in Formula 6 but instead would be equal the number of broadcast messages slots that must be reserved (Formula 5). This is still an improvement compared to SM.
We can also think of another variant SM-FSM (SM-Forward Some Messages) where neither all messages are forwarded like in SM-FAM nor only messages with new values are forwarded like in SM. The idea is to base the decision of whether or not to forward a message on a comparison between an already stored value and the newly received value. One possible implementation would be to forward the message that carries the new value only if the value is greater than the value that was stored before.
We can derive the pseudo code for SM-FSM by: a). substituting line 6 to 8 of the algorithm given in Figure 4 by the following pseudo code: We can combine SM-NC with SM-FSM to form SM-NC-FSM. In contrast to SM-NC-FAM the number of messages sent by SM-NC-FSM does not necessarily equal the number of broadcast messages slots that have to be reserved and may -depending on the protocol execution -be lower than the number calculated by Formula 5.
SUMMARY
In this paper we presented automotive use cases for byzantine agreement and gave examples of how byzantine faults can emerge in a FlexRay based system.
We then analyzed the worst case number of values to be temporarily stored by an ECU for the SM protocol. The proposed protocol modification SM-FAM reduces this number to a single value only. Since SM-FAM increases the average number of protocol messages sent while leaving unchanged the number of messages for which bandwidth must be reserved this protocol variant is only beneficial if it is used on a time triggered communication system. In these systems we cannot benefit from a reduction of the average number of protocol messages since we have to make static bandwidth reservations based on a worst case number of messages.
By slightly relaxing the fault model SM is based on we were able to introduce SM-NC. SM-NC significantly reduces both the worst case number of messages exchanged and the number of messages for which bandwidth must be reserved.
We finally discussed the combination of the two proposed protocol variants which resulted in a protocol variant that decreases the number of values to be stored as well as the worst case number of protocol messages exchanged.
